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Change in bank revenue; change in bank risk?  What has happened in Asia? 
By Barry Williams* and Gulasekaran Rajaguru 
School of Business  
Bond University 
Gold Coast  
Queensland  4229 Australia 
Abstract:  Increased bank non interest income has been found to be associated with higher 
bank specific risk as well as increased systemic risk (Brunnermeier, et al. (2012), Stiroh and 
Rumble (2006)).  We adopt a time series approach to this issue for Asian nations to present a 
different perspective to this literature.  We find that declines in bank interest margins are 
associated with both increased non interest income as well as increased bank risk.  We also 
find that bank capital holdings are insensitive to changes in bank revenue.  We argue that 
these results provide an objective basis for regulatory intervention to reduce the potential for 
systemic risk. 
1. Introduction. 
The composition of bank revenue has changed globally over the past two decades, with an 
increased emphasis upon non interest income.  In the case of the United States non interest 
income now accounts for up to half of all income earned by commercial banks (Nguyen 
(2012).    This shift has resulted from a shift in the nature of the competitive environment 
facing banks (Allen and Santomero (2001).  Competition from non bank providers of 
financial services (shadow banking) has placed increased price pressure upon both the asset 
and liability side of bank balance sheets.  The result has been lower returns from providing 
traditional borrowing and lending services, as measured by bank interest margins.  In 
response to this changing commercial environment banks have evolved their portfolio of 
products towards increased offering of fee based products.  This change in bank revenue has 
been extensively studied in the United States by authors such as Stiroh and Rumble (2006), 
Stiroh (2004), DeYoung and Rice (2004b), as well as in Europe, Lepetit, et al. (2008a), 
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Lepetit, et al. (2008b) and Australia; Williams and Prather (2010), Williams and Rajaguru 
(2013).  However, studies of this issue in the Asian context are relatively rare, with only one  
paper tangentially addressing this question that these authors are aware of; Williams (2013).1  
Thus, there is a gap in this literature that this paper seeks to fill by considering the change in 
bank revenue in the Asian region from a time series perspective while also establishing if this 
evolution of bank revenue is accompanied by a change in bank risk.  Furthermore, 
Brunnermeier, et al. (2012) demonstrated that higher levels of non interest income is 
associated with higher levels of systemic risk for bank holding companies in the United 
States.  Thus the relationship between bank revenue composition and bank risk have 
important implications for the post financial crisis design of financial system regulation. 
A number of studies have documented that increased bank non interest income is associated 
with increased bank risk (Stiroh and Rumble (2006), Lepetit, et al. (2008a) and that financial 
conglomeration is associated with a systematic discount (Laeven and Levine (2007).  A 
recent study by Nguyen (2012) has found that increased bank non interest income is 
associated with reduced risk adjusted profits.  Nguyen (2012) considered the relationship 
between traditional (interest margin) income and less traditional (non interest income) from 
the perspective of simultaneous Generalised Method of Moments estimation.  This paper will 
adopt a different approach by modelling the relationship between margin and non interest 
income applying panel vector autoregressions.  This will provide a strong control for the 
evolutionary nature of bank revenue over our study period while allowing us to 
simultaneously consider the evolution of bank risk. 
This study is of interest because the evolution of bank revenue and risk has important 
implications for the formulation of prudential policy after the recent financial crisis.  Studies 
of the Asian region can provide valuable contributions to this policy formulation as is has 
been some time since the Asian Financial Crisis and thus a post recovery perspective can be 
adopted. 
This paper finds that there is a stable time series relationship between bank margin revenue 
and bank non interest income, in that declines in margin income over time are being 
compensated for by increased non interest income.  Further, increased non interest income 
revenue is accompanied by increased bank risk.  Of interest to bank regulators is the finding 
                                                            
1 Williams (2013) considers the case of Indonesia only, rather than a wider study of the Asian experience as this 
study does. 
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that increased non interest income is not accompanied by changes in bank capital holdings.  
This finding is particularly relevant to post crisis prudential policy as changes in bank 
revenue provides an indicator as for potential increases in bank risk. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows.  The next section provides a more detailed 
review of the relevant literature, the third section details our data and methodology.  The 
fourth section presents and discusses the results of our estimations.  The final section 
concludes our paper with some policy implications and additional comments. 
2.  Literature Review. 
Models of intermediation presented by Diamond (1984) and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) 
argue that bank diversification provides a credible signal to the credit market of the bank’s 
ability to overcome information asymmetry, screen loan applications and monitor approved 
loans.  Further, traditional mean-variance portfolio theory provides scope for arguments that 
diversification of bank revenue reduces volatility of the revenue portfolio.  Additionally, co-
delivery of both interest based as well as fee based financial products provides the bank with 
benefits from economies of scope.  However, Jensen (1986) and Berger and Ofek (1996) 
have counter-argued that increased bank focus exploits returns from specialised managerial 
expertise as well as reducing potential agency conflicts.  The conflict between these 
perspectives as well bank deregulation, in particular the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 
removing the separation between commercial and investment banks in the United States, has 
resulted in a burgeoning literature addressing the role bank revenue composition plays in 
bank risk.  This literature has occurred against a backdrop of banks increasingly evolving 
toward becoming financial conglomerates offering one-stop financial services (van Lelyveld 
and Knot (2009).  The evolving sophistication of financial products and the on-going process 
of financial innovation has also seen the banking sector facing increased competition from 
the non-bank sector (shadow banking) (Lepetit, et al. (2008a); Slager (2006)), with a resulting 
change in the product mix provided by banks. 
Empirical studies considering the portfolio diversification benefits of banks generating 
increased non interest income have adopted several different perspectives.  Prior to the 
deregulation of the United States banking system simulated merger studies such as Lown, et 
al. (2000), Santomero and Chung (1992) and Saunders and Walter (1994) have found support 
for combining banks with other types of financial service firms, especially insurance.  Smith, 
et al. (2003) found a weak negative correlation between interest and non interest income, 
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suggestive of portfolio diversification benefits.  In contrast, more recent work has considered 
the actual revenue composition of banks and its relationship with observed bank risk.   
Studies such as DeYoung and Rice (2004a), Stiroh (2006) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006) 
have found that increased bank non interest income is associated with worsening risk-return 
trade-offs.2  It was found that the volatility effect of riskier non interest income outweighed 
any portfolio diversification benefits.  In explaining these results it has been argued that bank 
management were focussed upon absolute levels of returns as opposed to a risk-return trade-
off and the negative incentives generated by too big to fail were culpable for at least part of 
these problems.  Recently, Nguyen (2012) also found that increased non interest income is 
associated with worsening risk-return trade-off and concluded that it has no diversification 
benefits. 
In contrast to the portfolio diversification argument, DeYoung and Roland (2001) present 
three explanations for the higher volatility of non interest income.  First, the bank-borrower 
relationship has higher switching costs than the one-off contracts that are part of many fee-
based relationships.  Second, non interest income has a higher operational leverage due to its 
reliance upon fixed costs as inputs.  Finally, generating non interest income is less reliant 
upon capital as an input and so this revenue has higher financial leverage. 
A number of studies have explored the role of non interest income in a world of imperfect 
information.  It has been argued that the bank-borrower relationship contains a valuable flow 
of information that can be used to cross-sell other financial services such as underwriting 
(Saunders and Walter (1994), Stein (2002)).  In a similar vein underwriting and funds 
management can generate a flow of information valuable to the lending function (Laeven and 
Levine (2007).  However, the evolution of the bank into a financial conglomerate generates 
increased complexity and thus information asymmetry with the associated scope for 
increased agency conflicts.  Evidence from the United States (Schmid and Walter (2009)) and 
globally (Laeven and Levine (2007)), as well as China (Berger, et al. (2010)) finds that the 
negative agency effects of this increased complexity dominate any portfolio diversification 
benefits.3   
                                                            
2 Stiroh (2004) found that the correlation between interest and non interest income in the United States is 
positive and increasing, thus providing further evidence against the portfolio diversification argument. 
3 Elyasiani and Wang (2008) argues that increased non interest income is associated with higher levels of 
information asymmetry. 
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Increased bank non interest income is not only associated with adverse outcomes for bank 
revenue volatility, but also with worsening loan quality.  Lepetit, et al. (2008b) found in the 
European case that banks with higher levels of non interest income were more likely to 
misprice loan risk, in accord with the loss leader hypothesis.  Under the loss leader 
hypothesis (also called the cross-selling hypothesis), banks choose to under-price credit risk 
on loans to establish an ongoing relationship, with the aim of extracting further revenue via 
non interest income at a later date.  Lepetit, et al. (2008a) found that the loss leader strategy 
results in an inefficient under-pricing of default risk of bank loans. 
To date only one study that these authors are aware of has considered the issue of bank 
revenue composition from a time series perspective.  Williams and Rajaguru (2013) modelled 
the relationship between bank margin income and non interest income in Australia using 
panel vector autoreggressions.  It was concluded that declines in margin income were being 
offset by increased non interest income, but that the increase in non interest income 
associated with declining margins was smaller than the decrease in interest margins, resulting 
in a wealth transfer in favour of those using banking services.   It was further argued that 
Australian banks have responded to falling interest margins by increasing the range of non 
interest services into areas such as insurance and funds management.   
The issue of changing income composition and bank risk is one that has been rarely explored 
in the Asian context; to date there is one paper that these authors are aware of addressing this 
issue; Williams (2013), which considered the Indonesian case.  Williams (2013) found no 
evidence of bank non interest income impacting upon Indonesian bank risk.  However, 
Williams (2013) had a focus upon the Indonesian banking experience during and after the 
Asian Financial Crisis, thus a wider cross nation study may be more appropriate. 
3. Sample and Method. 
This study will consider Asian region commercial and saving banks drawn from the 
BankScope database; banks operating in the ten member nations of the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) as well as Australia, New Zealand 
and Japan ware studied.4   The data covers the period 1998 to 2011, and has a total of 474 
                                                            
4 The last three nations are included so that the sample includes both developed and developing nations.  China 
was excluded due to the domination of its banking system by government owned banks which retain some 
degree of political direction in the lending function  (Berger, et al. (2009), Zhang, et al. (2012)). 
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banks and 3856 observations (unbalanced panel).  Table 1 details the national composition of 
the sample used. 
Table 1 about here. 
As discussed above, bank interest margins and non interest income are determined as a 
simultaneous process which interacts with bank level risk.  We will thus consider the panel 
vector autoregressive (Panel VAR) model to establish the link between bank interest margins 
and non interest income.  In this model we will control for bank level risk with a number of 
variables reflecting the different dimensions of bank risk.  As discussed previously Lepetit, et 
al. (2008b) found that higher bank non interest income is associated with poorer quality loan 
portfolios.  Details of the variables used to measure bank risk will be provided below. As 
discussed in the Ho and Saunders (1981) model of bank net interest margins, interest margins 
are a partial function of bank managerial risk aversion, which is conventionally measured 
using bank capital holdings.5  Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) argue that bank loan growth can 
represent bank risk, with loan to medium loan growth being necessary for ongoing bank 
profitability as well as economic asset formation  However, high levels of loan growth are 
argued to be associated with increased bank risk.  This argument was supported in the 
Indonesian case by Finally, a measure of bank revenue volatility will be included to 
determine if bank revenue risk is associated with bank non interest income, as discussed 
above. 
Conventionally bank revenue risk is measured by the standard deviation of either return on 
equity or return on assets, calculated over a four to twelve period moving window.6  This 
paper will adopt a different perspective; Parkinson (1980) argues that in small sample studies 
this conventional measure suffers from imprecision. Parkinson (1980) recommends using 
Log (high value / low value); but in this study such a measure would be ill-defined for loss 
making banks.  Instead we adopt the method of Alizadeh, et al. (2002) and use Log (high 
value – low value ) for both return on average assets and return on average equity. As 
discussed in both Alizadeh, et al. (2002) and Parkinson (1980) as few as two observations can 
be used to generate an estimate of bank risk using this method.  Table 2 has the descriptive 
statistics of the variables used in this study. 
 
                                                            
5 See also Maudos and Guevara (2004), Williams (2007),  and Nguyen (2012). 
6 As a recent example see De Haan and Poghosyan (2012). 
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Table 2 about here.  
Examination of the loan growth statistic s showed a small number of extreme values.  Thus 
we will conduct robustness analysis later in this paper to consider if these extreme values bias 
any results. 
Method. 
In order to analyse existence of systematic trade-off between interest and non interest income 
in ASEAN as found by Williams and Rajaguru (2013) in Australia, we estimate the following 
multivariate dynamic panel data model7. 
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 are bank-specific and time-specific fixed effects 
respectively. ti,  is a multivariate normally distributed four components simultaneously in 
the risk vector namely: (i) Asset Quality, (ii) Loan Growth, (iii) Capital Holdings and (iv) 
Revenue Volatility.   
(i) Asset Quality: In Europe Lepetit, et al. (2008b) and Lepetit, et al. (2008a) found that 
increased levels of bank noninterest income is associated with lower quality loans and an 
inefficient trade-off between risk and return.  Williams (2007) found a negative relationship 
between Australian bank NIMS and bank asset quality, suggesting a perverse pricing for bank 
risk. There are a number of different measures of bank asset quality available, some are 
stocks, are some are flows, and they mostly tend to lag the economic cycle. (Laeven and 
Majnoni (2003) ), although they are supposed in some cases to be forward looking. We 
consider two different measures for asset quality: Impaired loan reserves divided by total 
loans and, loan loss provisions divided by total loans. Several other loan quality measures are 
available in BankScope but due to national differences in disclosure they result in significant 
                                                            
7 Standard panel unit root tests confirm that all variables in the model are stationary. Hence, we estimate the 
short-run relationships between the variables of interest. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the panel unit 
root test results. However, it can be made available fro author upon request. 
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reductions in available data. These measures are considered independently one at a time to 
avoid the problem of inefficiency due to multicollinearity.  
(ii) Loan Growth: Change in loans and (change in loans)2 are jointly included in the model to 
capture the non-linearity arising from loan growth. It is conventionally argued that low to 
medium levels of loan growth are needed for on-going banking system and economic 
viability while high levels of loan growth are associated with increased risk of loan portfolios. 
(Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997).  As discussed previously we will deal with the impact of 
outliers in the loan growth variable in our robustness analysis. 
(iii) Capital Holdings: We consider one primary measure of capital holdings, total equity 
divided by total assets.  Ideally a measure of Tier One capital holdings would be included in 
the model as a robustness test, but again data limitations due to differences in national 
disclosure would results in substantial reduction in degrees of freedom.  However, the third 
iteration of the BIS capital adequacy framework places increased emphasis upon a  simple 
gearing measure such as we employ in this study as well as a risk weighted capital holdings, 
thus the use of a simple gearing measure has increased relevance to current policy 
formulation. 
(iv) Revenue volatility: Traditionally standard deviation or variance have been used in the 
finance literature to measure revenue risk, but as pointed out by Parkinson (1980), when 
small samples are used measures of this type tend to be biased and inefficient.  We adapt the 
approach used by Alizadeh, et al. (2002), of log (high –low) to measure the revenue volatility. 
We consider two measures of revenue volatility: return on assets and return on equity. The 
model is estimated by including these measures independently and the results are reported in 
Table Three. 
We estimate a fixed effects model with bank specific dummies, rather than a random effects 
model, as the i ’s are likely to represent omitted bank-specific characteristics which are 
correlated with other explanatory variables.8  Since yit is a function of µi, then so too is yit-1. 
Therefore, yit-1 is correlated with it and OLS results in biased and inconsistent estimates, 
even if the it ’s are serially uncorrelated. Accordingly, we first difference equation (2) to 
eliminate the country-specific fixed effects, i.e., 
                                                            
8 Under an assumption of independence between the fixed effects and the explanatory variables, the generalised 
least squares estimator for the random effects model is biased (Hsaio, 1986). 
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We estimate the parameters of equation (2) by the generalised methods of moments (GMM) 
technique proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The technique uses the pre-determined 
lags of the variables as instruments to exploit a potentially large set of over-identifying 
restrictions and provides consistent coefficient estimates.9 The lag length q is determined by 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Schwarz Criteria (SC).  Both suggest the optimal 
length of 1 for all specifications. 
The validity of the assumptions used to obtain equation (2) can be tested using the standard 
test of over-identifying restrictions, viz., a Sargan test. Note that it is MA(1) with a unit 
root. Hence, the key identifying assumption that there is no serial correlation in the 
disturbances can be tested by testing for no second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, while negative first-order serial correlation is expected in the first-
differenced residuals. 
In table Three, we present the GMM estimates for net interest income and non interest 
income.10 First, note that the AR(1) and AR(2) test statistics indicate that the residuals in 
equation (1) are serially uncorrelated and that the Sargan test confirms the validity of the 
instruments 
. 
4.  Results. 
It is found overall that changes (reductions) in net interest margins are offset by changes 
(increases) in non interest income.  Margin income is observed to have fallen significantly 
over the study period by comparison to the reference year of 1998. 
Unlike Lepetit, et al. (2008b), this paper finds no evidence that increased bank non interest 
income is associated with worsening asset quality.  Generally measures of asset quality were 
found to have no relationship with non interest income.  In a few cases a negative and 
significant relationship between asset quality and non interest income was found.  This result 
                                                            
9 Due to concerns about the number of instruments when using the GMM estimator, we collapse the number of 
instruments using Roodman’s procedure (see Roodman, 2009). 
 
10 The statistical significance of the estimated parameters is determined through a bootstrap sample of 10,000 
replications.  We argue that this process reduces the any potential biases due to extreme values in the loan 
growth variable, but we will conduct robustness analysis of this question. 
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would indicate that banks are replacing income from loans with non interest income from 
loan substitutes such as debt underwriting or loan guarantees.  Further, this change is 
resulting in those loans retained on the balance sheet being of higher quality.  However, in 
some cases a negative relationship between bank asset quality and bank net interest margins 
is also found, contrary to the theoretical propositions (Ho and Saunders (1981), Angbazo 
(1997).  However, Williams (2007) found a similar result in the Australian case and argued 
that banks were mispricing loans and effectively buying market share via under-pricing loan 
risk.  Such a result is also consistent with Guiso, et al. (2006) who found that bank 
liberalisation in Italy has been accompanied by reduced bank interest margins and increased 
bad loans. 
Table Three about here. 
Consistent with the empirical results surveyed above, this study finds that higher levels of 
non interest income is associated with increased revenue volatility.  However, there is limited 
support for a relationship between interest margin income and revenue volatility.11  Evidence 
is also found of a U-shaped relationship between loan growth and non interest income (but no 
evidence found for a relationship between loan growth and margin income).  Authors such as 
Foos, et al. (2010) and Laeven (2002) have argued that excessive loan growth is associated 
with worsening loan quality, indicating that increased non interest income is associated with 
deteriorating loan quality via the loan growth channel.  Some evidence was found that banks 
with higher holdings of equity have higher interest margins, consistent with the Ho and 
Saunders (1981) model of bank interest margins, as supported by subsequent empirical 
evidence (Williams (2007), Maudos and Guevara (2004)).   It is noteworthy however, that 
bank capital holdings are found to be insensitive to changes in non interest income.  This is 
particularly important given the important role bank capital holdings play in the global 
benchmark capital adequacy process.  After the 2008 financial crisis the major global 
regulatory reform process in banking has focussed upon developing and implementing the 
third variation of the capital adequacy process (commonly called capital adequacy mark III).  
However, this study finds in the Asian context that non interest income is risk increasing but 
has no relationship with capital holdings.  As bank capital holdings are used as a buffer to 
protect depositors and other stakeholders against bank risk, this finding has the implication 
that bank regulators (at least in Asia) need to pay increased attention to bank revenue 
                                                            
11 This is consistent with the argument that traditional margin income is less risky (Clarke, et al. (2007). 
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composition when determining bank capital holdings.  Nations such as Australia have already 
implemented capital regimes that allow the national regulator to require individual banks to 
hold capital in addition to that required under national version of the capital adequacy 
regime. 12   Given the evidence found in this paper, requiring individual banks to hold 
additional capital to compensate for the additional risk induced by revenue composition 
would be a worthwhile consideration. 
Robustness Tests. 
In order to determine that the results were not driven by either size or growth effects we 
conducted two sets of robustness tests.  In the first test we truncated our sample by size, 
removing those banks that made up the largest twenty five per cent of all banks and then re-
estimating our models.  We then also truncated our original sample by removing the smallest 
twenty five percent of all banks and re-estimating our models.  These results are found in 
Table Four.  The only discernable impact found was that for smaller banks no relationship 
between loan growth squared and non interest income was found.  We then repeated the 
truncation exercise for loan growth, in that the fasted growing quarter of all banks were 
removed and the models re-estimated, and then the lowest growing quarter of all banks were 
removed and the models re-estimated.   The results of these tests are also shown in Table 
Four, in this case any impact upon the estimated coefficients are shown in the shaded cells. In 
each case the shaded cell indicate no change in sign, but rather a change from insignificance 
to significance (or vice versa in one case).  
Table Four about here. 
5. Conclusions and policy implications. 
We find that increased non interest income is associated with increased bank risk, consistent 
with Brunnermeier, et al. (2012), DeYoung and Rice (2004b) and Stiroh (2006).  However, 
we also find that bank capital holdings are insensitive to these changes in bank revenue and 
bank risk.  Bank capital shows no relationship with changes in bank non interest income.  
There is also evidence that bank loan pricing is perverse, in that bank net interest income is 
lower when loan risk is higher.  While this outcome is inconsistent with the model presented 
by Ho and Saunders (1981), it is consistent with the empirical evidence presented by 
                                                            
12 See: http://www.apra.gov.au/ADI/upload/Final-APS-110-November-2007.pdf   The details of these additional 
capital holdings are not made public and are subject to confidentiality restrictions. 
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Williams (2007) and Guiso, et al. (2006).  We argue, consistent with Lepetit, et al. (2008b) 
that banks are adopting a loss leader strategy, in that lower NIMS are being used to attract a 
customer base (resulting in under-pricing for risk).   The intent is that later revenue from non 
interest sources will recoup the lost interest margin income.  However, we also find that this 
strategy is inefficient in that no relationship between loan quality and non interest income is 
found, thus the later revenue streams are not compensating for bank risk created with the 
initial loan under-pricing. 
We also find some evidence of a substitution effect in that fee income is negatively 
associated with asset quality, in that banks with higher levels of non interest income have 
lower levels of loan loss provisions. It is not clear if this effect is due to differences in 
accounting disclosure of loan loss provisions or if banks with lower quality loans in our 
sample choose to transfer the risk to other investors via securitisation, thus accounting for the 
observed increase in non interest income.  Further work on the on quality of loans securitised 
by ASEAN regions banks before and after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 would assist in 
determining if this morally hazardous behaviour occurred.  Another possibility is that poorer 
quality loans moved to the shadow banking system over this period, while the rise of shadow 
banking resulted in increased non interest incomes for bank in this region.  Again this would 
be an issue worthy of further research, but one beyond the scope of the current paper. 
From the perspective of the prudential regulator and those responsible for systemic stability 
this paper has found several relationships that should act as warning signs or tripwires that 
alert to the presence of increased bank risk.  First, increased bank non interest income is 
associated increased bank risk, and bank management are not holding higher levels of capital 
to compensate for this increased risk.   Given that the evidence from the United States, 
Brunnermeier, et al. (2012), demonstrates that increased non interest income is associated 
with higher systemic risk, this is a cause for concern.  Further, we find that falling bank net 
interest margins is associated with worsening loan portfolio quality, with no compensating 
increase in revenue from other sources.  Again this is a concern for those responsible for the 
ongoing viability of the financial system.  Overall, both these indicators present objective 
evidence for increased surveillance of, and / or increased regulatory requirements imposed 
upon, those banks which present with these symptoms suggesting increased risk. 
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Table 1: Nations and number of banks per year. 
 
Number of Banks 
 
 
  
1998 
  
2002 2006 2001 1998 - 2011 
  
Number of observations 
(1998-2011) 
Australia 10 3 21 11 33 168 
Brunei Darussalam 1 1 1 0 1 14 
Cambodia 0 1 2 1 3 20 
Indonesia 35 36 45 21 67 590 
Japan 33 136 130 107 173 1752 
Laos 1 1 1 0 2 13 
Myanmar 3 2 3 3 5 34 
Malaysia 34 24 23 13 43 378 
New Zealand 2 1 8 6 12 64 
Philippines 6 1 28 15 39 210 
Singapore 7 4 10 5 25 110 
Thailand 13 17 19 13 26 257 
Vietnam 4 9 27 10 45 246 
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Table 2 Dependent and independent variables. 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max Observations 
Net Interest 
Margin / Total 
Assets (%)  
2.719 2.705 -41.730 31.750 3856 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (%) 
0.851 1.271 -7.926 17.942 3853 
Impaired Loan 
reserves/ Total 
Loans (%) 
0.033 0.782 -43.000 8.026 3522 
Loan Loss 
Provisions / 
Total Loans (%) 
0.006 0.422 -21.000 4.342 3696 
Tier 1 Capital 
ratio (%) 
12.072 17.097 -122.610 300.840 2731 
Total Equity / 
Total Assets 
0.080 0.101 -1.292 0.998 3867 
One year loan 
growth %13 
46.67 2799.00 -55217.00 152055.00 3409 
 Range based 
Volatility ROA 
= log (high 
ROA – Low 
ROA) 
1.284 5.533 0.000 100.390 3360 
 Range based 
Volatility ROE 
= log (high 
ROE – Low 
ROE) 
17.868 61.509 0.000 1065.040 3359 
  
                                                            
13 After removing five outliers: Mean = 17.55, Sd = 74.29, Minimum = -95.00, Maximum = 1617.00,  
Outliers are, Rakuten Bank Ltd – 2009,Seven Bank Ltd – 2011, ShinGinko Tokyo – 2006, Bank Artha 
Graha Internasional Tbk – 2005, Indonesia Eximbank – 2000,  
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Table 3. Panel A 
  
Net Interest 
Margin / 
Total Assets 
(%) 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (%)   
Net Interest 
Margin / 
Total 
Assets (%) 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (%) 
Net Interest 
Margin / 
Total Assets 
(%) (t-1) 0.755*** -7.59E-05** 
Net Interest 
Margin / Total 
Assets (%) (t-1) 0.729*** -0.0001** 
  (0.07) (0.00)   (0.06) (0.00) 
Non Interest 
Income / 
Total Assets 
(%) (t-1) -5.21** 0.898*** 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (%) (t-1) 0.06292 0.883*** 
  (2.63) (0.07)   (4.43) (0.07) 
Asset Quality Asset Quality 
Impaired 
Loan 
Reserves/ 
Total Loans 
(%) 1.019*** -0.029 
Impaired Loan 
Reserves/ Total 
Loans (%) 2.858 -0.037 
  (0.38) (0.02)   (2.86) (0.03) 
Bank Capital Holdings Bank Capital Holdings 
Total Equity 
/ Total Assets 41.44** 0.233 
Total Equity / 
Total Assets -35.08 0.196 
  (19.79) (0.21)   (50.38) (0.61) 
Loan Growth Loan Growth 
Loan Growth 6.73E-07 -0.1.63E-08*** Loan Growth 1.13E-06 -2.40E-08** 
  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Loan Growth 
squared -7.63E-14 
6.91421E-
16*** 
Loan Growth 
squared -7.63E-14 3.58E-16*** 
  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Revenue Volatility Revenue Volatility 
Range based 
Volatility 
ROA -2.44* 0.011** Risk_ROAE -0.0301 0.0002** 
  (1.42) (0.01)   (0.05) (0.00) 
Constant 205.395*** 0.622*** Constant 238.18*** 0.49* 
  (32.29) (0.23)   (30.67) (0.26) 
Diagnostics: Diagnostics: 
Sargan statistic 
48.3 30.5 
Sargan statistic 
52.9 28.8 
Sargan p-value 
0.341 0.952 
Sargan p-value 
0.195 0.971 
AR(1) -3.436*** -11.61*** AR(1) -2.898*** -5.81*** 
AR(2) -0.36 -0.43 AR(2) -0.79 -0.52 
Notes: a) Standard errors are in the parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote rejection of null of zero restriction at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance (based on bootstrapping), respectively; 
b) The Sargan statistic tests over-identifying restrictions (based on bootstrap samples).  AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order 
and second order serial correlation (based on bootstrap samples). 
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Table 3 Panel B.  
  
Net Interest 
Margin / 
Total 
Assets (%) 
Non Interest 
Income / 
Total Assets 
(%)   
Net Interest 
Margin / Total 
Assets (%) 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (%) 
Net Interest 
Margin / Total 
Assets (t-1) 0.742*** -0.0009** 
Net Interest 
Margin / Total 
Assets (t-1) 0.706*** -0.0008* 
  (0.06) (0.00)   (0.06) (0.00) 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (t-1) -4.606* 0.80*** 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (t-1) -8.77* 0.792*** 
  (2.48) (0.04)   (5.20) (0.04) 
Asset Quality Asset Quality 
Loan Loss 
Provisions / 
Total Loans (%) 3.81*** -0.08** 
Loan Loss 
Provisions / 
Total Loans 
(%) 10.412 -0.07* 
  (1.01) (0.04)   (10.82) (0.04) 
Bank Capital Holdings Bank Capital Holdings 
Total Equity / 
Total Assets 90.48* 0.267097 
Total Equity / 
Total Assets -31.31 0.17 
  (48.76) (0.64)   (51.57) (0.56) 
Loan Growth Loan Growth 
Loan Growth 3.40E-07 -1.99E-08* Loan Growth 1.04E-06*** 8.08E-09 
  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Loan Growth 
squared -2.13E-14 6.26E-16 
Loan Growth 
squared -1.0E-013* -6.67354E-16* 
  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Revenue Volatility Revenue Volatility 
Range based 
Volatility ROA 3.92*** 0.007* 
Range based 
Volatility ROE 0.026 0.0003** 
  (1.50) (0.00)   (0.05) (0.00) 
Constant 160.05*** 0.344 Constant 208.856*** 0.362824 
  (38.82) (0.27)   (32.77) (0.24) 
Diagnostics: Diagnostics: 
Sargan statistic 
29.02 45.86 
Sargan statistic 
22.9 34.6 
Sargan p-value 
0.969 0.436 
Sargan p-value 
0.997 0.869 
AR(1) -3.548*** -10.03*** AR(1) -4.051*** -4.95*** 
AR(2) -0.31 1.29 AR(2) -0.37 -0.984 
Notes: a) Standard errors are in the parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote rejection of null of zero restriction at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance (based on bootstrapping), respectively; 
b) The Sargan statistic tests over-identifying restrictions (based on bootstrap samples).  AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second 
order serial correlation (based on bootstrap samples). 
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Table 4 Robustness Tests. 
Table 4. Panel A (i) (Smallest 25% of Banks by assets removed)  
  
Net Interest 
Margin / 
Total Assets 
(%) 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (%)   
Net Interest 
Margin / 
Total 
Assets (%) 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (%) 
Net Interest Margin 
/ Total Assets (t-1) 0.761*** -0.00036** 
Net Interest 
Margin / Total 
Assets (t-1) 0.759*** -0.0004** 
  (0.07) (0.00)   (0.07) (0.00) 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (t-1) -8.71** 0.956*** 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets  (t-1) 0.881 0.954*** 
  (3.61) (0.04)   (0.68) (0.05) 
Asset Quality Asset Quality 
Impaired Loan 
reserves/ Total 
Loans (%) 4.56*** -0.012 
Impaired Loan 
reserves/ Total 
Loans (%) 4.490 -0.013 
  (1.74) (0.02)   (2.78) (0.02) 
Bank Capital Holdings Bank Capital Holdings 
Total Equity / 
Total Assets 13.98* 0.529 
Total Equity / 
Total Assets -12.51 0.137 
  (8.47) (1.67)   (53.94) (1.03) 
Loan Growth Loan Growth 
Loan Growth 9.19E-07 -7.47E-09*** Loan Growth 1.10E-06 -7.82E-09** 
  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Loan Growth 
squared -1.19E-13 -8.58E-16** 
Loan Growth 
squared -1.26E-13* -7.92E-16* 
  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Revenue Volatility Revenue Volatility 
Range based 
Volatility ROA -0.79** 0.009* Risk_ROAE -0.1100 0.00016** 
  (0.40) (0.00)   (0.16) (0.00) 
Constant 130.33*** 0.287*** Constant 131.76*** 0.21** 
  (35.61) (0.23)   (33.12) (0.12) 
Diagnostics: Diagnostics: 
Sargan statistic 
44.58 17.6 
Sargan statistic 
42.92 18.8 
Sargan p-value 
0.570 1.000 
Sargan p-value 
0.560 1.000 
AR(1) -2.91*** -2.36*** AR(1) -2.61*** -2.79*** 
AR(2) 0.27 0.093 AR(2) 0.46 0.66 
Notes: a) Standard errors are in the parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote rejection of null of zero restriction at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance (based on bootstrapping), respectively; 
b) The Sargan statistic tests over-identifying restrictions (based on bootstrap samples).  AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second 
order serial correlation (based on bootstrap samples). 
c) Low 25% truncated means that the 25% of the smallest firms are removed from the sample and the model re-estimated.   
d) The shaded cells indicate a change of significance when the bottom 25% of firms by loan growth are removed and the model is re-
estimated.  In no case was there a change of sign, only some changes in significance.  Yellow means changes from significant to 
insignificant and green means changes from insignificant to significant.  
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Table 4 Panel A (ii) (Largest 25% of Banks by assets removed) 
  
Net Interest 
Margin / 
Total Assets 
(%) 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (%)   
Net 
Interest 
Margin / 
Total 
Assets 
(%) 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (%) 
Net Interest Margin / 
Total Assets (%) (-1) 0.703*** -0.000589** 
Net Interest Margin / 
Total Assets (%) (-1) 0.607*** -0.0002** 
  (0.07) (0.00)   (0.05) (0.00) 
Non Interest Income / 
Total Assets (%) (-1) -4.88** 0.763*** 
Non Interest Income / 
Total Assets (%) (-1) 1.76 0.749*** 
  (2.54) (0.19)   (1.94) (0.22) 
Asset Quality Asset Quality 
Impaired Loan reserves/ 
Total Loans (%) 2.39*** -0.043 
Impaired Loan 
reserves/ Total Loans 
(%) 1.570 -0.044 
  (0.58) (0.03)   (1.49) (0.04) 
Bank Capital Holdings Bank Capital Holdings 
Total Equity / Total 
Assets 59.77* 0.373 
Total Equity / Total 
Assets -43.11 0.281 
  (36.91) (1.67)   (68.02) (0.99) 
Loan Growth Loan Growth 
Loan Growth 4.32E-07 -5.83E-09*** Loan Growth 2.10E-06 -5.81E-09** 
  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Loan Growth squared -5.40E-13 3.63E-16 Loan Growth squared -2.09E-13 -3.13E-16** 
  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Revenue Volatility Revenue Volatility 
Range based Volatility 
ROA -1.64** 0.021* 
Range based 
Volatility ROE 0.0020 0.00024** 
  (0.79) (0.00)   (0.09) (0.00) 
Constant 183.21*** 0.961*** Constant 241.58*** 0.59** 
  (96.11) (0.30)   (84.91) (0.32) 
Diagnostics: Diagnostics: 
Sargan statistic 
40.31 22.5 
Sargan statistic 
49.38 36.12 
Sargan p-value 
0.570 0.998 
Sargan p-value 
0.302 0.825 
AR(1) -3.42*** -9.31*** AR(1) -7.63*** -6.11*** 
AR(2) -0.86 -0.89 AR(2) -1.04 -0.21 
Notes: a) Standard errors are in the parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote rejection of null of zero restriction at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance (based on bootstrapping), respectively; 
b) The Sargan statistic tests over-identifying restrictions (based on bootstrap samples).  AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second 
order serial correlation (based on bootstrap samples). 
c) Top 25% truncated means that the largest 25% of the firms are removed from the sample and the model re-estimated.   
d) The shaded cells indicate a change of significance when the top 25% of firms by loan growth are removed and the model is re-estimated.  
In no case was there a change of sign, only some changes in significance.  Yellow means changes from significant to insignificant and green 
means changes from insignificant to significant. 
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Table 4 Panel B (i) (Smallest 25% of banks by assets removed) 
  
Net 
Interest 
Margin / 
Total 
Assets (%) 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (%)   
Net 
Interest 
Margin / 
Total 
Assets (%) 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (%) 
Net Interest Margin / 
Total Assets (%) (t-1) 0.716*** -0.0004** 
Net Interest 
Margin / Total 
Assets (%) (t-1) 0.719*** -0.0004* 
  (0.07) (0.00)   (0.07) (0.00) 
Non Interest Income / 
Total Assets (%) (t-1) -10.41* 0.845*** 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (%) (t-1) -11.08* 0.843*** 
  (6.06) (0.04)   (6.33) (0.03) 
Asset Quality Asset Quality 
Loan Loss Provisions 
/ Total Loans (%) 6.845*** -0.08** 
Loan Loss 
Provisions / Total 
Loans (%) 7.29* -0.08* 
  (2.29) (0.04)   (4.35) (0.05) 
Bank Capital Holdings Bank Capital Holdings 
Total Equity / Total 
Assets 65.74* -0.095 
Total Equity / 
Total Assets -53.05 0.125 
  (34.37) (1.15)   (56.64) (1.01) 
Loan Growth Loan Growth 
Loan Growth 6.55E-07 -4.62E-09* Loan Growth 
6.13E-
08*** 5.99E-09 
  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Loan Growth squared -5.38E-14 6.96E-16 
Loan Growth 
squared -7.33E-08* -7.27E-16* 
  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Revenue Volatility Revenue Volatility 
Range based 
Volatility ROA 1.89*** 0.002* 
Range based 
Volatility ROE 0.274 0.0001** 
  (0.21) (0.00)   (0.16) (0.00) 
Constant 117.83*** 0.146 Constant 120.44*** 0.12 
  (39.62) (0.23)   (39.51) (0.23) 
Diagnostics: Diagnostics: 
Sargan statistic 
42.12 25.62 
Sargan statistic 
36.65 18.31 
Sargan p-value 
0.595 0.991 
Sargan p-value 
0.808 1.000 
AR(1) -5.158*** -3.91*** AR(1) -4.457*** -3.63*** 
AR(2) -1.15 0.81 AR(2) -0.83 1.358 
Notes: a) Standard errors are in the parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote rejection of null of zero restriction at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance (based on bootstrapping), respectively; 
b) The Sargan statistic tests over-identifying restrictions (based on bootstrap samples).  AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second 
order serial correlation (based on bootstrap samples). 
c) Low 25% truncated means that the smallest 25% of the firms are removed from the sample and the model re-estimated.   
d) The shaded cells indicate a change of significance when the smallest 25% of firms by loan growth are removed and the model is re-
estimated.  In no case was there a change of sign, only some changes in significance.  Yellow means changes from significant to 
insignificant and green means changes from insignificant to significant. 
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Table 4Panel B (ii)  (Largest 25% of Bank by assets removed) 
 
  
Net Interest 
Margin / Total 
Assets (%) 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (%)   
Net Interest 
Margin / 
Total Assets 
(%) 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (%) 
Net Interest Margin 
/ Total Assets (%) 
(t-1) 0.852*** -0.0016** 
Net Interest Margin 
/ Total Assets (%) 
(t-1) 0.623*** -0.0012* 
  (0.07) (0.00)   (0.07) (0.00) 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (%) (t-1) -5.32* 0.713*** 
Non Interest 
Income / Total 
Assets (%) (t-1) -5.91* 0.665*** 
  (3.12) (0.03)   (3.01) (0.08) 
Asset Quality Asset Quality 
Loan Loss 
Provisions / Total 
Loans (%) 1.97*** -0.07** 
Loan Loss 
Provisions / Total 
Loans (%) 12.39* -0.07* 
  (0.16) (0.03)   (7.62) (0.04) 
Bank Capital Holdings Bank Capital Holdings 
Total Equity / Total 
Asets 120.52* 0.387 
Total Equity / 
Total Asets -22.01 0.238 
  (73.33) (0.48)   (33.83) (0.72) 
Loan Growth Loan Growth 
Loan Growth 1.96E-07 -2.81E-09* Loan Growth 6.10E+01 9.92E-09 
  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Loan Growth 
squared -1.34E-14 5.49E-16 
Loan Growth 
squared -4.64E-08* -5.88E-16* 
  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Revenue Volatility Revenue Volatility 
Range based 
Volatility ROA 4.63*** 0.014*** 
Range based 
Volatility ROE -0.008 0.0006** 
  (1.88) (0.00)   (0.01) (0.00) 
Constant 183.78*** 0.401 Constant 95.77*** 0.497 
  (49.19) (37.00)   (12.37) (0.39) 
Diagnostics: Diagnostics: 
Sargan statistic 
22.36 51 
Sargan statistic 
20.69 53.42 
Sargan p-value 
0.998 0.250 
Sargan p-value 
0.999 0.182 
AR(1) -2.94*** -8.94*** AR(1) -3.987*** -2.96** 
AR(2) -0.77 0.02 AR(2) -0.27 -0.563 
Notes: a) Standard errors are in the parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote rejection of null of zero restriction at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance (based on bootstrapping), respectively; 
b) The Sargan statistic tests over-identifying restrictions (based on bootstrap samples).  AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second 
order serial correlation (based on bootstrap samples). 
c) Top 25% truncated means that the largest 25% of the firms are removed from the sample and the model re-estimated.   
d) The shaded cells indicate a change of significance when the top 25% of firms by loan growth are removed and the model is re-estimated.  
In no case was there a change of sign, only some changes in significance.  Yellow means changes from significant to insignificant and green 
means changes from insignificant to significant. 
 
